Centers for Cognitive Science Research Endangered and Underdescribed Languages Language Acquisition Spatial Cognition Computational Modeling of Cognition Theory of Mind Evolution of Cognition Applied Cognitive Science

Frederick Adams Dr. Adams research tends to be in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language. In epistemology he is currently defending "tracking theories" which say that, under the right cognitive and environmental conditions, one has knowledge when one's true beliefs track the truth. In philosophy of mind, he defends naturalized theories of meaning or semantics. These views are tied very closely to the former views in epistemology and say that structures in the mind acquire their meaning by, basically, tracking objects, properties, and relations in one's environment. And in philosophy of language, he also defends theories which trace the meanings of words and language to relations with one's environment. Selected Papers: 2003 The Informational Turn in Philosophy of Mind. In Minds and Machines, 13, 471-501. This paper traces the application of information theory to problems in the philosophy of mind from 1950 to the present. It includes reference to work by Dennett, Dretske, Fodor, Perry, Sayre and others 2004 (with Steadman, A.) Intentional Action and Moral Considerations: Still Pragmatic. Analysis, 64,268-276. This paper considers recent empirical surveys by Joshua Knobe designed to show that in the folk conception, it is possible to do A intentionally without intending to do A. Adams and Steadman argue that Knobe's data do not support that conclusion and they offer a pragmatic alternative to his understanding of the data. 2004 (with Dietrich, L.) Swampman's Revenge: Squabbles Among the Representationalists. Philosophical Psychology, 17, 323-340. This paper compares and contrasts the views of two representationalists (Tye and Dretske) on the matter of whether Swampman (a creature with no history of environmental interaction) can have conscious, qualitative mental states. Tye says yes. Dretske says no. Adams and Dietrich side with Dretske. 2005 (with Aizawa, K) Defending non-derived content. Philosophical Psychology, 18,. 661-669. This paper defends the view that there is non-derived semantic content. The view there there is has been rejected by Dan Dennett, among others. This paper responds mainly to the arguments by Dennett and shows them to fail to show that there is not non-derived (or intrinsic) semantic content Contact Info: Phone: 302-831-8206 Email: fa AT udel DOT edu